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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY *
Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations pro-
vides for the severance of commercial, financial, and personal
relations between a covenant-breaking State and the other mem-
ber States.' The proposed application of economic sanctions
against a recalcitrant State represents the first step under inter-
national agreement whereby the employment of economic pres-
sure is to become a means of maintaining the peace of the world.
The control of this powerful weapon rests finally with the Coun-
cil of the League and its application calls for the rendering of
mutual assistance by the member States in accordance with
such plans as the Council may deem feasible. Failure of a State
to observe its obligations under Articles 12 to 17, inclusive, of
the Covenant opens the way to a consideration by the Council 
of
the issues involved. Should the offending power continue in an
unyielding mood the League will ultimately set in motion the ma-
chinery for the application of economic pressure.
2
*The security treaties recently signed at Locarno provide for Germany's
entrance into the League of Nations and for German membership on the 
League
Council. The signatory powers have accepted the view that 
the obligations
which Germany shall assume under Article 16 of the Covenant are 
subject to the
interpretation embodied in Article ii of the Geneva Protocol. It is 
considered
that Germany as a member of the Council will have every opportunity 
of pro-
tecting her special position if the problem of applying economic 
sanctions ever
arose. The attitude of Great Britain or other leading powers 
towards the
Protocol in no way affects their acceptance of the amendments 
or reservations
attaching to Article 16. The machinery of applying economic 
measures, as out-
lined in this study, has been set up by the League itself. The Protocol 
and the
security treaties simply incorporate principles which the League 
is prepared to
put into effect.
'The original Article i6 also provided that the Council "recommend 
to the
several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or 
air force the
members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces 
to be
used to protect the covenants of the League." The member States 
also agree
to co-operate in applying financial and economic measures and to allow 
passage
for the forces of any members thus co-operating in protecting 
the League
covenants. Any member violating any such covenants may be 
declared no
longer a member of the League.
2By Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the League Covenant the members agree to
submit their disputes to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council. 
They agree
not to go to war within three months after an award by the arbitrators 
or a,
report by the Council has been made as well as to carry out the 
award in good
faith. They commit themselves not to go to war with any member 
complying
with such award or decision. The Council shall, in case 
further steps are
(155)
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The Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, approved by the League Assembly in September, 1924,
has underlying it the principle of compulsory arbitration and
rests upon the recognition of economic, naval, and military sanc-
tions. It strengthens Article 16 of the Covenant by placing
military force directly behind the economic sanctions. It in-
creases the Article's significance by making it impossible for a
nation to enter upon aggressive war without inviting upon
itself the application of the economic blockade. When all the
instrumentalities for arbitration and peaceful settlement of a
dispute between the contending parties have been exhausted, the
Council "shall call upon the signatory States to apply forthwith
against the aggressor the sanctions provided by Article ii" of
the Protocol. Such signatory States become entitled thereupon
to exercise the rights of belligerents and their obligations with
regard to the sanctions of Article 16 of the Covenant imme-
diately become operative.
The obligations which the members of the League accepted
under the terms of Article 16 were the subject of much discus-
sion during the first two years of the League's operation. Early
in 1921 the Council appointed an International Blockade Com-
mission whose recommendations constituted the basis of a series
of resolutions which the Assembly formally adopted in October
of that year.4  The Sixth Committee of the First Assembly had
in the meantime undertaken a preliminary study of the prob-
lems connected with the application of economic measures. The
conclusions of the Commission passed under the final considera-
tion of the Assembly late in 1921 and were formally adopted
necessary to check any of the parties to the dispute, publish a report containinga statement of the facts in the dispute and of its conclusions. In case the reportis not unanimously adopted by the members not parties to the dispute thedisputants are free to take whatever individual action each may consider neces-sary. If the question at issue is by international law solely within the domesticjurisdiction of the parties the Council shall, by Article 15, not make a recom-mendation as to its settlement. If, however, any member resorts to war inviolation of the obligations assumed under these provisions, Article I6 shall atonce become applicable.
'Should the two parties to the dispute be deemed aggressors the economicand financial sanctions shall be applied to both.
'Official Journal, Specialist Supplement, No. 6 (Oct., 1921), 24-26. See alsoLEVERmoRE, SECOND YEARBOOK OF THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS, 162-164.
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in the nature of nineteen interpretative and qualifying resolutions.
These rules of procedure are intended to guide the League in
prescribing the course of action should any case calling for
economic sanctions arise.
International law contains no precedents for the applica-
tion of such far-reaching measures against a State as are con-
templated in Article i6.5 The assumption on which the efficacy
of the economic boycott rests, viz., the growing economic inter-
dependence of the nations of the world, itself suggests that there
exist no traditional bases for its application. As to the effective
results of commercial and financial pressure, we find ample
testimony in the economic desert which the close of the war
revealed in Central Europe. The Paris Resolutions of 1916 and
the contemporaneous German efforts looking toward a post-war
economic union in "middle Europe" indicated that the belligerents
clearly realised the role which the possession or effective control
of essential raw materials would be bound to play in the inter-
national relations of the future.
The sanctions of Article 16'are, of course, only a part of
a new and formal plan of international organization. Before
the end of 19I4 the far-reaching effect of war under modern
conditions was painfully evident and in all the great commercial
countries there appeared responsible bodies of citizens with plans
for a world organisation which should make for international
understanding and guard against war. Practically all seriously
proposed schemes provided for economic sanctions.,
The First Assembly of the League of Nations, late in 1920,
turned seriously to the examination of certain fundamental fea-
tures of the Covenant. The application of Article i6, together
with the problems relating to mandates and disarmament, was
assigned to the Sixth Committee, where a subcommittee under
'Pacific blockade represents the nearest approach to the application of
pressure against States against which it is not considered necessary or desir-
able to open hostilities. Pacific blockade has, however, been generally limited
to action by greater against smaller powers. It is not a close precedent for the
comprehensive .measures whose international application a recalcitrant power,
great or small, invites upon itself by violating its obligations under the Protocol.
'See, for example, the plan of the League to Enforce Peace in World Peace
Foundation, Pamphlet Series, VI, No. 6. For outline of English, French and
German proposals see DUGGAN, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Chapter VII.
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the chairmanship of Lord Robert (now Viscount), Cecil prepared
a preliminary report. The problem proved an intricate one and
when the International Blockade Commission met in August,
1921, all the member States were requested to have their Gov-
ernment submit any information, data, or suggestions which
they could collect from their experiences in enforcing the block-
ade against Germany during the war. "In approaching the prob-
lem of Article 16," the Third Committee of the Second Assembly
reported, "we are bound to recognise that this Article has estab-
lished a new system of law which, by reason of its very novelty,
raises many questions and gives rise to many difficulties of inter-
pretation." 7
Factors of geography, differences in resources, and inequal-
ities in naval power, immediately lay at the basis of differences
of opinion which became articulate when the Assembly met in
September, 192o. The absence of two of the most nearly self-
sustaining States added to the difficulties. The Covenant did
not answer the question, Who is to judge when a State may
rightfully apply pressure against a neighbor? Again, Shall all
member States apply economic measures simultaneously and with
equal force? What powers, if any, are to apply an effective
naval blockade in case the law-breaking power has an unguarded
sea-coast? Does the unilateral action of the aggressor create a
state of war? What duties are to be imposed upon non-member
States in case one or more should border on the Covenant-break-
ing power? What steps should be taken against a non-member
in case it refuses to accept the obligations of the League Cove-
nant? These and other questions of a similar nature clearly
suggested the comprehensive scope of those clauses of the Cove-
nant which pertain to economic sanctions.
On August 3, 1920, Signor Tittoni, of Italy, read a report
on the "economic weapon" at the San Sebastian meeting of the
Council in which he briefly summarised the implications of
economic penalties and recommended that immediate steps be
taken to formulate a set of rules to guide the League and the
Second Assembly Records, Plenary Meetings, 402.
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individual member States in assuming their obligations under
Article 16.8 The Council thereupon passed a resolution request-
ing the Assembly to consider, at it first session, "the measures
necessary to ensure the application of Article I6." Inasmuch as
the Scandinavian countries had already submitted an amend-
ment 9 to paragraph one of this Article it was not without sig-
nificance that the members of Lord Cecil's subcommittee were
the representatives of smaller powers and were in sympathy with
the reservation proposed by the former "North-European
neutrals."
On December IO, 1920, the Assembly formally recommended
that the Council appoint an International Blockade Commission,
to consist of not more than eight members, "to examine the
application of Article i6" and to report its conclusions to the
Council.Y After the final formulation of the Nineteen Resolu-
tions by the Assembly a year later, the Secretary-General sub-
mitted them to the members for acceptance. Certain amend-
ments to Article 16 which are awaiting ratification at the pres-
ent time may induce changes in these rules, but "so long as the
aAssembly Document No. 20 (Io/5971/16), 3; First Assembly Records,
Meetings of Committees, II, 332-334.
9 The amendment proposed by the Scandanaviancountries early in 1921 was
an extension of paragraph one: "At the request of a member for whom the
application of the above provisions might entail serious danger the Council may
authorise the member to maintain intercourse in such measure as the Council
may decide, with the Covenant-breaking State." First Assembly Records,
Meetings of Committees, Vol. I, 68-71. The viewpoint of the Scandanavian
powers was well expressed by the Swedish Government: "It can indeed be
imagined that . . . the Great Power . . . might be tempted to
occupy the territory of the smaller Power, so as to protect the very important
economic interests which, as a result of the blockade, would be at stake. For
this reason the Swedish Government is of the opinion that it would be desirable
in cases of this nature to leave to the Council the option of modifying in some
measure the obligation upon a member of the League to take part in the block-
ade." 72. Besides South Africa, represented by Lord Cecil, the countries rep-
resented on the Sub-Committee were Sweden, Jugoslavia, Roumania, and Switz-
erland.
"Official Journal, 2d year, No. 2 (March-April, 192I), 117. The powers
represented on the Blockade Commission were Cuba, Spain, Norway, Switzer-
land, and the four permanent members of the Council-Great Britain, France,
Italy and Japan. The Secretary-General of the League addressed two circular
letters dated February 25, and March 21, 1921, to the League members request-
ing that they submit, for the use of the Commission any explanatory statements
regarding their interpretation of Articles 12-17 of the Covenant and any state-
ments concerning the blockade of Germany during the war which might be
useful. Official Journal, Nos. 5-6 (July-August, 1921), 431.
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amendments have not been put in force in the form required by
the Covenant" these proposals shall "constitute rules for guid-
ance" in the application of the economic blockade.-'
Diplomatic relations are to be limited in the beginning to the
withdrawal of the heads of missions.' 2  Consular relations shall
continue as long as possible 13 and humanitarian work is not to be
disturbed by the severance of commercial relations.14 In accord-
ance with the spirit of the Covenant "the League of Nations
should attempt, at least at the outset, to avoid war, and to restore
peace by economic pressure." 15 Lord Cecil pointed out the neces-
sity of distinguishing between an act of war and a state of war
and maintained that the unilateral action of the defaulting State
was by itself insufficient to create a state of war. He expressed
the view that the action of the defaulter merely entitled the
other States to resort to acts of war or to declare themselves in a
state of war with the Covenant-breaking State. This view
finally prevailed. 16
Whose duty is it to decide whether a breach of the Cove-
nant has taken place? On this point opinion in the Assembly was
divided. A memorandum prepared by the Secretary-General
affirmed that "a primary responsibility rests upon each Govern-
ment to take action so far as its own nationals and own national
machinery are concerned, arrangements being made by each of
them separately and not by a single international authority." 17
Signor Schanzer, of Italy, and Dr. Benes, of Czecho-Slovakia,
among others, upheld the contention that it would be dangerous
for each State to decide for itself when to institute a blockade.
Dr. Benes frankly expressed the view that the Council alone
'Resolution Number One.
'Resolution Number Eleven.
'Resolution Number Twelve.
'Resolution Number Sixteen.
Resolution Number Three.
Second Assembly Records, Meetings of Committees, 287. See also M. de
Aguero (Cuba) on the distinction between a "state of war" and an act of war,
288. M. Huber (Switzerland) received general support in his contention that
Article 16 could not possibly be interpreted as automatically creating a state of
war for, he maintained, the League of Nations should never create a state of
war, 289.
' First Assembly Records, Meetings of Committees, II, 335.
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had authority to decide whether a breach had taken place and to
order the members of the League to resort to economic penalties.' 8
The Dutch representative held out strongly for freedom of judg-
ment on the part of the individual States.' 9 He was supported
by Mr. Fisher, of Great Britain, and by Lord Cecil. The latter
expressed the opinion that, when once the Council-or the
Assembly if in session-had informed the members that the obli-
gations to act had arisen each State was morally bound to act
in close co-operation with the rest in order to produce the most
effective blockade.20 M. Oka, the Japanese representative, main-
tained that the right of each State as a sovereign power to make
its own decisions ought to be safeguarded but that it is, at the
same time, essential that executive decisions be centralised in the
Council in order to compel unity of action.2' It was definitely
agreed that each member of the League should decide for itself
whether a breach of the Covenant had been committed. At the
same time, it was to be understood that the fulfilment of their
duties under Article 16 is required from members of the League
by the express terms of the Covenant and that they cannot
neglect them without breach of their treaty obligations.22
The Assembly made it clear that the duties of the Council
in the enforcement of the economic blockade were confined to
making recommendations. The final decision regarding the mo-
ment when a State shall apply sanctions and by what means
such sanctions are to be enforced lie with the individual member
States. Their obligations under the Covenant commit them to
mutual co-operation but they remain legally free to determine
their own line of action. The Assembly formally admitted that
it is impossible to decide in advance and in detail the various
measures that should apply in a particular case. The Council
was, however, to recomme-nd to the League members a plan for
joint action whenever a case should arise.23
Ibid., 266.
"'Ibid., 262.
2DIbid., 265.
'Second Assembly Records, Meetings of Committees, I, 292.
' Resolution Number Four.
'Resolution Number Ten.
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While the decisions of the Council under Article i6 are not
legally binding and do not constitute executive action this body
remains, nevertheless, in control of the machinery which exists
for the enforcement of punitive measures. All cases of breach
of the Covenant are to be referred to the Council. Upon notice
from a League member or from the Secretary-General that a
breach has occurred, or that a breach threatens, the Council shall
meet as soon as possible.24  The Council then summons represen-
tatives of the parties to the conflict and of all States which are
either neighbors of the defaulting State or which, because of
their economic relations with such State, should be consulted
in order to assure the greatest degree of co-operation. If the
Council is of the opinion that a State has been guilty of a breach
of the Covenant the minutes of the meeting at which such opinion
was reached shall at once be sent to all the League members.
At the same time there shall be submitted a statement of reasons
for action and a recommendation regarding the exact nature
of such action. The Council may, if it so desires, be assisted by
a technical committee to convene in continuous session as soon as
the action decided upon is taken.
25
The Council recommends the date on which the enforcement
of the economic measures are to commence. The final decision
vetoed the Blockade Commission's suggestion that the Council
" In the summer of 1921 when the military forces of the Serb-Croat-
Slovene State crossed the Albanian frontier, Lloyd George, then Prime Minister
of Great Britain, sent a telegram to the Secretary-General advising him to
"take immediate steps to summon a meeting of the Council to consider the
situation and to agree upon measures to be taken under Article I6 in the event
of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government refusing or delaying to execute their
obligations under the Covenant." Monthly Summary of the League of Nations,
Vol. I, No. 8 (December, 1921), 175.
' In addition to the Serbian-Albanian crisis of 192i two other incidents
created situations which threatened to bring Article i6 into operation. Early
in 1923 M. Viviani, then President of the Council, served notice on Lithuania
that Article 16 would be applied against her in case her Government continued
to violate the armistice agreement of October 7, ig2o, with Poland. See
Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, Vol. III, No. 3 (March, 1923),
23. See also, NEw Yopa TIMES, February 4, 1923. The other crisis which, at
first, promised to call for action under Article i6 was the Corfu affair between
Greece and Italy in August, I923. The peaceful settlement, effected through the
Council of Ambassadors, however, avoided the necessity of direct action by the
Council. On the nature of the settlement see A. L. LowEI-, THE COUNCIL OF
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND CORFU, in World Peace Foundation, Vol. VI,
No. 3.
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"fix" the date. Neighboring States are thus not prevented from
taking special measures at once should their interests be
threatened.
2 6
The original text of Article i6 provided that member States
sever relations between "their nationals and the nationals of the
Covenant-breaking State." This provision was in accordance
with British and French practices inaugurated against Germany
early in the war. A French decree of September 27, 1914, had
made nationality the test of enemy trade and was followed a year
later by the British Blacklists. Under modem conditions the
easy means of shifting credits and the growth of contraband
lists allow enemy nationals to carry on economic war from neu-
tral territory. The principle that nationality rather than resi-
dence should constitute the accepted criterion in the application
of measures against enemy trade immediately invited attack from
certain quarters. M. Motta, of Switzerland, declared that the
severance of economic intercourse must be between territories,
not between persons. In Switzerland, where fifteen out of every
hundred of the population are foreigners, the application of
Article 16, as originally phrased, would result in economic war
within the country. The Assembly accepted the Swiss viewpoint
and passed a resolution which provided that "for the purposes
of the severance of relations between persons belonging to the
Covenant-breaking State and persons belonging to other States
members of the League, the test shall be residence and not
nationality." 27 The Assembly at the same session adopted an
amendment to Article I6 which substituted "persons residing in"
for "nationals." 28
The French representatives remained firm in their opinion
that the original provisions were essential to the prohibition of
enemy trade. M. Reynauld's powerful plea led to an agreement
by the Assembly which provided that both residence and nation-
ality should form the basis for prohibiting trade with a default-
"Second Assembly Records, Plenary Meetings, 44o.
'Resolution Number Thirteen.
' Handbook of the League of Nations, 192o-1924, World Peace Foundation,
Pamphlet Series, Vol. VII, Nos. 3-4, 255.
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ing State. 29  Late in its second session the Assembly adopted an
amendment embodying the new proposals. The members were
slow in ratifying, not because of general disapproval, but be-
cause it was not clear what limitations existed to the employment
of economic force under the widening scope of Article 16. In
order to remove these uncertainties Great Britain proposed an
amendment of a more definite and detailed nature which the
Assembly adopted at its fifth session in September, 1924. This
amendment is at present before the members for ratification.80
On November 27, 192o, Lord Robert Cecil read a statement
before the Committee on Armaments, Mandates and the Economic
Weapon in which he suggested that the International Blockade
Commission work out a practicable plan which should offer pro-
tection for countries which, by virtue of their geography and
economic position, would incur grave dangers by enforcing a
blockade against a neighboring State. Switzerland, Holland and
the Scandinavian "neutrals" experienced these disadvantages
during the Great War. The Assembly accepted the argument
that "it may be necessary to recommend the execution of special
measures by certain States." 81 The Blockade Commission had
reported somewhat vaguely that the Council should undertake to
grant exemptions to certain powers, thereby allowing their re-
spective Governments to derogate from the steps involved in the
application of Article 16.82 The Assembly, however, refused
to accept any reservations which allowed certain States to issue
-' Second Assembly Records, Plenary Meetings, 8o8-81o.
'o The amended text reads as follows: "Should any Member of the League
resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV,
it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other
Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to
the severance of all trade or financial relations and to prohibit all intercourse
at least between persons resident within their territories and persons resident
within the territory of the covenant-breaking State and if they deem it expedient,
also between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State,
and to prevent all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse at least between
persons resident within the territory of that State and persons resident within
the territory of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not,
and if they deem it expedient, also between the nationals of that State and the
nationals of any other State whether a Member of the League or not" Monthly
Summary of the League of Nations, Vol. IV, No. 9 (September, 1924), 177.
' Resolution Number Nine.
'Document A.28.i92i.V.; C.288.I92i.V. 7.
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licenses, a process bound to open the flood-gates of exemptions.
An amendment to the original draft resolution, offered by M.
Poullet, of Belgium, introduced a cleverly devised scheme of
"graduated" measures. This substitution provided that "if it is
thought desirable to postpone, wholly or partially, in the case of
certain States, the effective application of the economic sanctions
laid down in Article 16 such postponement shall not be permitted
except in so far as it is desirable fori the success of the common
plan of action, or reduces to a minimum the losses and embarrass-
ments which may be entailed in the case of certain members of
the League through the application of the sanction." 33
On February 27, 1921, the Council instructed the Secretary-
General to communicate to the League members a request that
they submit, for the use of the Blockade Commission, all avail-
able information which they could feel free to release relative
to the means at their disposal for the enforcement of Article 16.3
4
The replies to the letter lacked agreement. In most coun-
tries the enforcement of the necessary measures is dependent
upon special legislation. In France, for example, special legis-
lative acts are necessary when the measures extend to prohibi-
tions of importations and exportations of goods and the seizure
of goods. The obligations cannot be carried out by executive
decree except in regard to the prohibition of certain classes of
goods.85 The Swedish Government is compelled to act in accord-
ance with special legislation only when aiming to prohibit com-
mercial transactions in the transport of merchandise between
home ports and foreign ports. In exceptional circumstances it
may issue import and export prohibitions and take general
measures of control. The extent of immediate executive action
in a particular case remains uncertain. 6 The Swiss reply ex-
plained that the Government has the de facto control over almost
' Resolution Number Nine.
" Official Journal, 2d year, No. 2 (March-April, I92i), I17.
" Official Journal, Nos. 5-6 (July-August, 1921), 433.
' The Swedish Government may also regulate all transport service and is
empowered to suspend communications by rail between Sweden and other
countries and to prohibit the conveyance of goods, passengers, or news to any
particular country.
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all means of communication between Switzerland and foreign
countries. No special difficulties could, therefore, arise in case
the immediate suspension of such communications were ordered
into effect.37 Finland assured the Commission that no previous
consent of the Finish Parliament would be required to warrant
immediate steps by the Government to fulfil the obligations under
Article 16.38 The Dutch Government submitted a lengthy
memorandum on the subject of the Queen's powers which showed
that the validity of particular measures depends upon the nature
of the circumstances and that the period of their validity is lim-
ited. Besides, there exist certain restrictions upon the applica-
tion of executive measures.
3 9
The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes not only, adopts the sanctions of Article i6 but
it adds "teeth" to their structure. Dr. Benes, reporting for the
Third Committee of the Fifth Assembly in September, 1924,
commented on the nature of the sanctions under the Protocol in
these significant phrases:
"It is true that no burden has been imposed on States
beyond the sanctions already provided for in the Covenant.
But, at present a State seeking to elude the obligations of
the Covenant can reckon on two means of escape-
(i) The Council's recommendations need not be fol-
lowed.
(2) The Council may fail to obtain unanimity, making
possible any declaration of aggression, so that no
obligation to apply military sanctions will be im-
posed and everyone will remain free to act as he
chooses.
"We have abandoned the above system and both these
loopholes are now closed." 40
'Ibid., 434.
"Ibid., 435.
'Document A, 32/1921 (C. B. 4a), 30-31.
I Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments, Documents and
Proceedings of the Fifth Assembly, Information Section, League of Nations
Secretariat, p. 65. See also Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, Sup-
plement, October, 1924, 29.
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The obligation of the signatory States to apply sanctions
now arise directly from the decision of the Council. Each sig-
natory is bound "in resistance to an act of aggression, to col-
laborate loyally and effectively in applying the sanctions in
accordance with its geographical situation and its particular situa-
tion as regards armaments." The sanctions provided for in
Article 16 of the Covenant are fundamentally economic, but as
interpreted and amplified in the Protocol they are "not merely
economic but also military." 41
Article 17 of the Covenant invites a non-member State to
accept the obligations of membership in case of a dispute between
it and a member State. Should the non-member refuse and resort
to acts of war the provisions of Article 16 become applicable.
The International Blockade Commission passed rather lightly
over this question. With States such as Russia, Germany, and
the United States outside the League the best that the members
could hope for was passive co-operation from such States.
42
Under the Protocol if a non-member of the Covenant or non-
signatory of the Protocol refuses to conform to the pacific pro-
cedure of the instrument and resorts to war the sanctions of
Article 16 of the Covenant, as interpreted and amplified by the
provisions of the Protocol, will be applied to it.43 That the
enforcement of these provisions under present conditions is ap-
parently hopeless in certain possible cases was given by Great
Britain as one of the objections to the Protocol. On March 12,
1925, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, speaking for the British Empire,
told the Council in session at Geneva that Great Britain could not
ratify the arbitration and security pact. He declared that "it is
'Ibid., 78. M. Politis in Assembly debate.
'Resolution Number Seventeen. See also Second Assembly Records,
Meetings of Committees, I, 292. In this connection the revised Lodge Reso-
lutions presented by the Foreign Relations Committee to the United States
Senate November 6, 1919, are of interest. Number 12 read: "The United States
reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a Covenant-
breaking State, as defined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than that
violating said Article 16, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal
relations with the nations of the United States." Cong. Record, Vol. 58, Part
8. 66th Cong., ist sess., 8023.
" Article 16 (of the Protocol).
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most unwise to add to the liabilities already incurred without tak-
ing stock of the degree to which the machinery of the Covenant
has been already weakened by the non-membership of certain
great States." 44
Article i i of the Protocol enjoins the signatories to assume the
obligations of loyal and effective co-operation in resisting any act
of aggression. Geographical position and relative naval and mili-
tary strength are to be taken into account by the Council in its
recommendations. The Nineteen Resolutions, provisionally in
force, adopt this principle. It follows logically that should it
become necessary to enforce a naval blockade against an aggressor
the burden should fall upon the leading naval powers in propor-
tion to their relative naval strength and according to their proxim-
ity to the scene of possible war.4' The provisions of Article ii
of the Protocol have raised the question in England regarding
the use of the British fleet in the settlement of future European
outbursts calling for belligerent action. The Protocol here rep-
resents the emergence of a new conception of international law
which runs counter to the traditional view of British naval su-
premacy. European statesmen must find a means of adjusting
this new conception to those new conditions which arise from a
growing interdependence, economic and political, among the na-
tions of the world.
Amos E. Taylor.
University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pa.
"Extract No. 29 from the Official Journal, April 1925, 2.
' Resolution Number Eighteen provides for the application of a naval
blockade in certain instances.
